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Instructions on Taxes in Personal Injury Suits
Lloyd J. Fingerhut*
T HE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE enacted in 1954 has continued
the 1939 Code provision of law that damages received,
whether by suit or agreement, for personal injuries or sickness,
are exempt from the Federal income taxation, by providing that
such awards are specific exclusions from gross income.1 In light
of this, many defense attorneys engaged in suits of such nature
are asking the courts to instruct the jury of such provision, or in
their closing arguments are mentioning the same. The introduc-
tion of the provision in closing arguments has been the cause of
many appeals and subsequent reversals due to prejudicial error.
There are three basic arguments used in support of bringing
such information to the attention of the jury. The following is a
brief sketch of each:
1. The weight of authority is that on the issue of earning
capacity evidence of gross earnings before taxes is proper. 2 "If,
then, the jury made its award on basis of the testimony of plain-
tiff's gross earnings, then plaintiff made a profit from his injuries,
because the award made by the jury is tax exempt. Had he not
been injured and earned this amount he would have paid sev-
eral thousand dollars income tax." 3
2. The jury may think that such awards are taxable and
compensate for same ". . . Present economic conditions are
such that most citizens, most jurors, are not only conscious of,
but acutely sensitive to, the impact of income taxes. Few per-
sons, other than those who have had special occasion to learn
otherwise, have any knowledge of the exemption involved in
this case. It is reasonable to assume the average juror would
believe the award involved in this case'to be subject to taxation.
It seems clear, therefore, that in order to avoid any harm such
misconception could bring about, it would be competent and de-
sirable to instruct the jury that an award of damages for per-
sonal injuries is not subject to Federal tax . .. Surely plaintiff
has no right to receive any enhanced award due to a possible
and we think, probable misconception on the part of a jury that
* The writer is a second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
He is a graduate of Ohio State University, where he majored in accounting.
1 Section 104(a) (2) I. R. C. (1939) and Section 22(b) (5) I. R. C. (1954).
2 9 A. L. R. 2d 320.
3 Texas and N. 0. R. Co. v. Pool, 263 S. W. 2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1956
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
the amount allowed by it will be reduced by taxes. Such in-
struction would at once and for all purposes take the subject
of income taxes out of the case." The preceding quotation is
from Justice Hollingsworth's opinion in stating the Supreme
Court of Missouri's favorable answer to such a plea, in the case of
Dempsey v. Thompson, decided July 14, 1952.
4
3. In such an instruction, the court is merely stating a law
to the jury. ". . . It is difficult to perceive how the law is dis-
torted by advising the jury of a simple and concise provision of
a statute. Such procedure is not uncommon in the trial of cases;
statutes and ordinances are frequently set forth, where appli-
cable, for the enlightenment of the jury . . ." 5 The case con-
taining this dictum was reversed in a higher court of the same
state,6 which opinion serves as a good rebuttal, as we shall later
see.
Let us now see how the courts have rebutted such argu-
ments.
As to the first of such reasons as set forth in (1) above, i.e.
gross income vs. net income, there is a great deal of judicial
opinion to counteract the reasoning used. We find in England,
Justice Tucker, speaking for the King's Bench, saying with ref-
erence to a physician recovering subject damages: ". . . It seems
to me, apart from the practice which has prevailed for so many
years (in not allowing such instructions) that restitutio in inte-
grum requires the plaintiff to be put in the position in which he
would have been vis-a-vis his patients, that is, to receive his
fees in full, and that questions of his ultimate liability to the
Inland Revenue are matters which do not concern the defend-
ant. ... A man's income is his own and he can do with it what
he likes. Income tax is a charge on the person and not on prop-
erty or gains; it is to be charged in respect of all property, profit
or gains. . . . To give tlhe defendant as wrongdoers, benefit of
the tax law, the State would certainly lose, and the measure of
the State's loss would be the measure of the defendant's gain." I
Such theory is also used in this country, as pointed out by
the opinion of Judge Bland. In speaking of alimony in Phillips
v. Phillipss he states " .. . Courts may not readjust a tax burden
in a way not intended by Congress. .. ." The Sixth Circuit
4 Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S. W. 2d 42 (Mo. App., 1952).
5 Hall v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 349 Ill. App. 175, 110 N. E. 2d 654 (1953).
6 Ibid.
7 Billingham v. Hughes, 1 K. B. 643, 9 A. L. R. 2d 311 (1949).
8 Phillips v. Phillips, 219 S. W. 2d 249 (K. C., Mo. App., 1949).
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Court of Appeals, in February of 1945, followed this same line of
reasoning, although in relation to bringing to the jury's attention
amounts to be recovered under Workmen's Compensation, by
saying that "damages wrought by a wrongdoer are measured
by the whole loss. The party injured is entitled to recover for
all the loss inflicted and the wrongdoer may not take advantage
of the contracts or other relations that may exist between in-
jured persons and third persons. The ethics of this rule are
that the wrongdoer should not have the benefit of a fund or
contract directly or indirectly or by circumvention, to which he
in no wise has contributed." 9 The same rebuttal to the original
theory was differently expressed by the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois, by stating that ". . . If the jury were to mitigate the dam-
ages of the plaintiff by reason of income tax exemption accorded
him, then the very intent of Congress to give such injured party
a tax benefit would be nullified." 10
The courts have also looked at such a contention in the light
of the practicability of such reasoning. ".. . We can neither specu-
late nor conjecture as to how plaintiff's financial status might be
affected in the future by business booms or depressions." 11
A problem would arise in the mathematical separation of
the loss of earnings award from the overall damage award which
also contains medical expenses and compensation for pain and
suffering, as well as cause the discussion of all manifestations
of tax deductions. An Ohio Court of Appeals' opinion best brings
this out by stating ". . . The result of several such inquiries
would so complicate the trial of a personal injury action, into an
intricate discussion of tax and non-tax liabilities, and so confuse
the ordinary jury with technical tax questions, as to defeat the
purpose of a trial." 12
As to the second argument, as discussed in (2) above-the
thoughts of the jury-we can look to the Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas, which answers it by saying ".... It assumes that the jury
will not confine itself to the evidence nor the court's charge,
but will consider and take into account matters not mentioned
therein. This is to assume that there will be misconduct on the
part of the jury, an assumption in which we cannot indulge. ' 13
9 Majestic v. Louisville and N. R. Co., 147 F. 2d 641 (C. C. A. 6, 1945).
10 Hall v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., supra, n. 5.
11 Cole v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 59 F. Supp. 443, 445 (D. C., Minn.,
1945).
12 John R. Mans v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 128 N. E.
2d 166 (Ohio App., 1955).
13 Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R. Co. of Texas v. McFerrin, 279 S. W. 2d
410 (Tex. Civ. App., 1955).
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Such reasoning is further emphasized by the reversal by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Hall v. Chicago & Northwestern Rail-
way Co., in which the court says that "... . It may be conceded
that the possibility of harm exists if the jury is left uninformed on
this matter; on the other hand, it is conceivable that the plain-
tiff could be prejudiced if they were told of this law. In either
case, however, the possibility is speculative and conjectural, and
such being the case, it is better to instruct the jury on the proper
measure of damages and then rely on the presumption that they
will properly fulfill their duty by following said instructions." 14
As to our third argument, brought out in (3) above-i.e. it
is a mere statement of the law-we can again look at the Hall
case,15 which easily shows the fallacy by stating that if such
were true then why would it be objectionable for plaintiff's
counsel to state that the expense of trial is not provided for in
instructions concerning damages; and the same for the cost of
medical witnesses, plaintiff's attorney, expense of depositions,
court reporting, and that the defendant (in this case a corpora-
tion), can deduct any award it pays from its income and excess
profits tax; and that amounts of rewards are allowed as ex-
penses for increasing railroad fares. This could be developed
ad infinitum, and all this is the law.
In summary it can be said that the majority of courts do
not allow such instructions to the jury.16 And as stated so well
by Judge Graven on November 28, 1955 in the case of Combs
v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Co., "...
In a final analysis, it would seem that the matter of the giving of
an instruction such as that requested . . . should be determined
from the viewpoint of judicial administration. A greater num-
ber of the courts are apparently of the view that the giving of
such an instruction would not in general be in the interest of
better judicial administration in that injection of the question of
income tax liability into jury cases would probably give rise to
more problems than it would solve .. ,, 17
14 Hall v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., supra, n. 5.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. Mans v. N. Y. C. & St. L. R. Co., supra, n. 12; Combs v. Chicago, St.
P., M. & 0. R. Co., 135 F. Supp. 750 (D. C. Iowa, 1955); Texas & N. 0. R. Co.
v. Pool, supra, n. 3; Aikens v. State of Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 206 (1904);
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. of Texas v. McFerrin, supra, n. 13;
Stokes v. United States, 144 F. 2d 82 (C. C. A. 2, 1944).
17 Combs v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Co., supra,
n. 16.
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